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DISCRIMINATION IN LIGHT OF THE 
NGARONOA LITIGATION 
Charlie Cox* 
The right to freedom from discrimination in New Zealand is underpinned by equality, one of the most 
influential, yet amorphous principles in political theory. This article argues that the failure of New 
Zealand courts to articulate the norms behind the anti-discrimination guarantee enables arbitrary 
and inconsistent reasoning. The decisions of the High Court in Taylor v Attorney-General and the 
Court of Appeal in Ngaronoa v Attorney-General thus reflect a wrong turn in New Zealand 
discrimination law, taken in the case of Ministry of Health v Atkinson. Because discrimination law 
necessitates moral judgment, this article argues that the courts have been wrong to treat 
discrimination law as a largely amoral enterprise. Seen in this context, it should be unsurprising that 
the decisions of Taylor v Attorney-General and Ngaronoa v Attorney-General appear to mask moral 
judgments behind a façade of empiricism and common sense, and reveal different conceptions of 
equality. 
I INTRODUCTION 
[T]he majestic equality of the laws … forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in 
the streets, and to steal their bread.1  
The principle of equality rests at the heart of almost all contemporary liberal moral and political 
theories.2 Unsurprisingly, equality has underpinned approaches to the right to be free from 
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1  Anatole France The Red Lily (Winifred Stephens (translator), Dodd, Mead & Co, New York, 1925) at 91.  
2  Louis P Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (eds) Equality (Oxford University Press, New York, 1997) at 1. 
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discrimination in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights).3 However, equality – 
without more – is a fundamentally elusive concept. It must be imbued with some moral underpinning 
to exist beyond the abstract.4 Anti-discrimination norms, therefore, are of crucial importance to the 
resolution of the pressing social issues placed in front of judges. A failure to clearly confront such 
norms, this article argues, permits a judicial subjectivity which threatens New Zealand's commitment 
to the rule of law. 
This article suggests that the approaches to the indirect discrimination issue in Taylor v Attorney-
General5 and Ngaronoa v Attorney-General6 (referenced together as "the Ngaronoa litigation") 
reflect a wrong turn taken in New Zealand anti-discrimination law. The test for discrimination, 
adopted in Ministry of Health v Atkinson,7 provides little normative guidance to a court seeking to 
apply the principle of equality. The two decisions are thus emblematic of concerns that, without such 
guidance, results are left to turn on the individual morality of the reviewing judge.  
In Part II, this article introduces the discrimination claim in the Ngaronoa litigation, which 
involved a claim that the blanket ban on prisoner voting is indirectly discriminatory. It compares the 
decision of Fogarty J in the High Court decision of Taylor with the decision on appeal in Ngaronoa.  
Part III places the Ngaronoa litigation in the context of a confused approach to discrimination 
jurisprudence in New Zealand. It contends that the anti-discrimination guarantee cannot be understood 
without reference to the principle of equality which underlies it. It concludes that the failure of the 
Court in Atkinson to provide normative guidance as to the anti-discrimination guarantee enables 
decisions to turn on arbitrary, ad hoc reasoning. 
Using Part III as a springboard, Part IV examines how these issues were borne out in the Ngaronoa 
litigation. It further considers how the result of the litigation might have differed if the courts adopted 
a different meaning of equality.  
  
3  See Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at 573 per Tipping J, as cited in Ministry of Health 
v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [116]. Section 19(1) reads: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993." 
4  See Peter Westen "The Empty Idea of Equality" (1982) 95 Harv L Rev 537. 
5  Taylor v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 355, [2016] 3 NZLR 111. 
6  Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643. The Ngaronoa litigation progressed 
to the Supreme Court, but the Court declined leave to appeal the discrimination issue because it did not 
consider it the "right case" to address the "intersection" between "the issues of discrimination and Māori 
overrepresentation": see Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 183 at [2]. 
7  Atkinson, above n 3.  
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II THE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM IN THE NGARONOA 
LITIGATION  
A The Context  
The right to vote has long been recognised as a core prerogative in a free and democratic society, 
underpinning equality and sustaining consent to government.8 Indeed, in 2010, Simon Bridges MP 
leapt to the defence of the "precious right", for which millions of "men and women have shed blood 
and lost their lives".9 This was in support of a Bill imposing a blanket disqualification on prisoners 
from voting. Since that Bill was enacted – as the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 (the Amendment Act) – the disenfranchisement of prisoners has caused heated 
debate, especially around election time.10 
The Ngaronoa litigation fell amongst a series of claims seeking to challenge the Amendment 
Act.11 Mr Arthur Taylor and the other applicants were in the custody of the Department of Corrections 
when the Amendment Act was enacted.12 They sought a declaration (among others) that the 
Amendment Act was unjustifiably inconsistent with the right to be free from discrimination on the 
grounds of race and ethnicity,13 recognised under s 19 of the Bill of Rights.14 The High Court and 
Court of Appeal both dismissed the claim.15 
B The Legal Framework 
The particular claim in the Ngaronoa litigation was of indirect discrimination.16 Indirect 
discrimination occurs when a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on a group or 
person because of a particular characteristic of that group or person that corresponds with a prohibited 
ground of discrimination.17  
  
8  Taylor v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 24 at [185].  
9  (21 Apr 2010) 662 NZPD 10339.  
10  See for example Daniel Botha "The prisoner voting ban is still a disgrace" (3 March 2019) The Spinoff 
<https://thespinoff.co.nz>. 
11  Taylor, above n 5, at [33]. 
12  At [1]. 
13  This article only examines race because it was the key ground argued before the Court of Appeal. See 
Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [115].  
14  Taylor, above n 5, at [42]. 
15  Taylor, above n 5, at [152]; and Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [164].  
16  Taylor, above n 5, at [128]; and Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [20].  
17  Human Rights Act 1993, s 21; and Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A 
Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at [17.12.1].  
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Theoretically, indirect discrimination can be on any ground if, in context, it is sufficiently 
connected to one of the listed prohibited grounds in the Human Rights Act 1993.18 The ground acts 
as a proxy for the protected ground.19 For example, imposing a minimum physical strength 
requirement for a job will not directly discriminate, because strength is not included in the list of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. But since men are likely to be physically stronger than women, 
the requirement may amount to indirect discrimination, because it will exclude far more women than 
men.20  
In the Ngaronoa litigation, the claimants argued that the Amendment Act disproportionately 
impacted on, and thus indirectly discriminated against, Māori "based on relative prison and minority 
populations".21 That is, because Māori are overrepresented in prison, blanket disenfranchisement 
adversely affects Māori more than it does other races.  
Both Courts accepted the test for discrimination set out in Atkinson.22 This requires that the 
claimant experiences:23  
(1) differential treatment on a prohibited ground with respect to a person or group in comparable 
circumstances; and 
(2) the treatment results in a "material disadvantage". 
For limb (1), both Courts affirmed comparator analysis as a helpful tool for determining the existence 
of differential treatment.24 A comparator is a person or group in comparable circumstances to the 
claimant but for their membership of a protected group.25 If there is differential treatment between 
the claimant and comparator, this suggests that the differential treatment was based on a prohibited 
ground.26  
While neither Court in the Ngaronoa litigation engaged with the point, as the Court of Appeal 
clarified following the Atkinson decision in the case of Child Poverty Action Group Inc v Attorney-
  
18  Human Rights Act, s 21. 
19  Tarunabh Khaitan A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 74.  
20  Selene Mize "Indirect Discrimination Reconsidered" [2007] NZ L Rev 27 at 28.  
21  Taylor, above n 5, at [42].  
22  Atkinson, above n 3, at [55]. 
23  At [55].  
24  Taylor, above n 5, at [137]; and Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [121].  
25  Child Poverty Action Group Inc (CPAG) v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 402, [2013] 3 NZLR 729 [CPAG] 
at [52].  
26  Asher Gabriel Emanuel "To Whom Will Ye Liken Me, and Make Me Equal? Reformulating the Role of the 
Comparator in the Identification of Discrimination" (2014) 45 VUWLR 1 at 2.  
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General (CPAG), limb (1) also requires a "causative link" between the differential treatment and 
prohibited ground.27 This may require separate analysis in indirect discrimination claims.28 
As Fogarty J noted in the High Court, formulations of the comparator are different in cases 
alleging indirect discrimination, where the focus is on "differential impact".29 As such, the choice of 
comparator must be group-based.30 Both groups will fall within a chosen "pool" of individuals to 
whom the facially neutral policy applies.31 
Limb (2) of the Atkinson test requires a context-based assessment of whether the differential 
treatment results in a "material disadvantage" to the claimant group.32 In Atkinson, the Court 
approvingly cited the High Court decision in Child Poverty Action Group Inc v Attorney-General, 
which noted the need to filter out claims where differential treatment results in only "theoretical, 
innocuous or de minimus [sic] disadvantage", recognition of which might trivialise the right.33 In 
Atkinson, the Court of Appeal substituted the language of "real/more than trivial" with "material 
disadvantage",34 but noted there was no "substantive difference" in meaning.35 
C The Reasoning of the High Court 
1 Differential treatment 
When considering comparator groups for limb (1) of the Atkinson test, Fogarty J appeared to 
tacitly accept the Attorney-General's submission that a comparison between Māori prisoners and non-
Māori generally would be inappropriate.36 The Attorney-General submitted that, while there was a 
correlation between Māori race and imprisonment, imprisonment was no "necessary extension" of 
Māori race.37 For Fogarty J, overrepresentation was a "happenstance" resulting from the "poverty and 
  
27  CPAG, above n 25, at [52]. 
28  At [52]. 
29  Taylor, above n 5, at [140].  
30  At [140].  
31  Khaitan, above n 19, at 75. 
32  Atkinson, above n 3, at [109].  
33  Child Poverty Action Group Inc v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2009-404-273, 25 October 2011 at 
[83], as quoted in Atkinson, above n 3, at [106]. 
34  At [109]. 
35  At [136]. 
36  Taylor, above n 5, at [144]. 
37  At [144]. 
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dysfunctional upbringings … common to most prisoners of every race".38 Because the adverse impact 
felt by Māori prisoners was not caused by their membership of a protected group, Māori prisoners 
and non-Māori generally were thus not properly comparable.  
Because of his view that Māori prisoners and non-Māori generally were not properly comparable, 
Fogarty J examined two alternative comparator formulations: first, between Māori prisoners and non-
Māori prisoners;39 and secondly, between prisoners generally and non-prisoners.40  
As for the first comparator, which he accepted as the "natural" option,41 Fogarty J held that there 
was differential treatment. But for their disenfranchisement, Māori prisoners could, through the 
electoral option, opt to register as voters in marginal seats, and thus wielded more electoral power 
than non-Māori prisoners.42 Because the Amendment Act also took away this discretion, it treated 
Māori prisoners unequally with respect to their non-Māori counterparts.  
In terms of the comparison between prisoners generally and non-prisoners, Fogarty J appeared to 
suggest that, because the Amendment Act disenfranchises all prisoners, there could be no differential 
treatment. Both Māori and non-Māori prisoners lose out with respect to non-prisoners.43 However, he 
did not make any formal determination on this point, preferring to move straight to the question of 
material disadvantage.44 For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that acceptance of this 
comparison would depart from the conventional wisdom that the prohibited ground should form the 
only material difference between the comparator groups.45 
2 Material disadvantage 
Turning to limb (2) of the test, Fogarty J's analysis of material disadvantage was the same for both 
comparator formulations he accepted. The loss of discretion to choose between electorates did not 
constitute "even indirectly a racist distinction or any indirect degrading of M[ā]ori prisoners".46  
  
38  At [147]. 
39  At [145]. 
40  At [148].  
41  At [145]. 
42  At [145]. 
43  At [148].  
44  At [150].  
45  Emanuel, above n 26, at 2.  
46  Taylor, above n 5, at [151].  
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D The Reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
While ultimately upholding the High Court finding that there was no discrimination, the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeal differed substantially.  
1 Differential treatment 
The Court accepted two alternative comparators: one between Māori and non-Māori prisoners (as 
was accepted before the High Court);47 and one between the Māori voting community and the non-
Māori voting community.48 The Court did not mention the comparisons between Māori prisoners and 
non-Māori generally or between prisoners generally and non-prisoners. 
Unlike the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that there was no differential treatment between 
Māori and non-Māori prisoners because the blanket disqualification placed all prisoners on equal 
footing. The removal of the electoral option treated Māori prisoners equally to non-Māori prisoners: 
neither group could vote. Its only effect was to remove "a downstream choice" which non-Māori 
prisoners never had.49 This reflected the Court's view "that it is not necessarily discriminatory to 
indirectly neutralise a provision facilitating positive discrimination".50 The result was thus 
characterised as one of "exact equality".51  
The Court supported its finding that there was no differential treatment between Māori and non-
Māori prisoners by referring to the floodgates which would be released in the alternative.52 A finding 
of differential treatment, the Court held, would be to expose the entire criminal justice system to 
claims by overrepresented groups. Such groups, like men, young persons and Māori are necessarily 
disproportionately affected by any prison policies which impact their basic freedoms, such as a 
measure restricting recreation time.53  
The comparison between the Māori and non-Māori voting communities was viewed more 
favourably by the Court of Appeal. The Court held that there was "an indirect difference in treatment" 
  
47  Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [132]. 
48  At [147].  
49  At [140]. 
50  At [145].  
51  At [140].  
52  At [138]. 
53  At [138]. See also Selwyn Fraser "Māori qua what? A claimant-group analysis of Taylor v Attorney-General" 
[2017] NZ L Rev 31 at 55. 
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between the two, because Māori are significantly more overrepresented in prison than other racial 
groups.54 
Confusingly, the Court did not invoke its floodgates concern in respect of this comparison. 
However, the concern that the entire criminal justice system might be exposed to a proliferation of 
claims appears to extend also to this comparator. It is perhaps owing to the view the Court took on 
material disadvantage on this comparator that its previous concerns about floodgates were excluded 
from the analysis.  
2 Material disadvantage 
There being no differential treatment with respect to the comparison between Māori and non-
Māori prisoners, the Court did not find it necessary to consider material disadvantage.  
In relation to the comparison between the Māori and non-Māori voting communities, the Court 
held that, because less than one per cent of either Māori or non-Māori were incarcerated at the time 
of its judgment, the impact was "so small" that there could be no material disadvantage suffered by 
the Māori voting community.55 
III DISCRIMINATION: AN "EMPTY" RIGHT? 
To understand the problem with the approach taken by the two Courts it is helpful to place the 
decisions in the wider context of the development of New Zealand discrimination law. This article 
suggests that each Court's approach reflects a wrong turn in New Zealand discrimination law taken in 
Atkinson. This wrong turn taken in Atkinson is best understood in the context of an ongoing debate 
about the constitutional legitimacy of, and philosophical underpinnings behind, the principle of 
equality. 
The basic issue with Atkinson is the Court's attempt to create a test for discrimination which 
involves little or no moral judgment. But, if it is empowered by equality, discrimination is inherently 
normative. Thus, because the two limbs of the Atkinson test provide little guidance to the reviewing 
court, they permit largely uninterrogated and ad hoc moral determinations, which are often masked 
as empiricism and common sense.  
A Equality or Non-Discrimination? 
In s 19 of the Bill of Rights, the drafters deliberately omitted the language of "equality" found in 
other bills of rights, favouring the ostensibly simpler language of "freedom from discrimination" and 
  
54  Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [147].  
55  At [148].  
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a limited number of prohibited grounds of discrimination.56 However, although this omission limited 
the permitted bases for judicial intervention, it failed to address the drafters' underlying concern about 
involving judges in contestable policy terrain. 
The drafters thought that the concept of equality was "elusive" and might lead the courts into the 
uncertainty of "substantive policy".57 To include equality would go against the assurances in the 
White Paper that, with few exceptions, the Bill of Rights "would not control matters of substance".58 
The decision to exclude equality thus reflected the process-based theory of constitutional legitimacy 
used by drafters to overcome the difficulties inherent in allowing judges – unelected officials – to 
unilaterally determine the application and scope of fundamental human rights.59 
Granted, freedom from discrimination is not simply a repackaging of "equal[ity] before and under 
the law".60 Discrimination is about treatment. It is "action-regarding":61 not being (at least directly) 
concerned with the situation people end up in. Because of this, anti-discrimination legislation will 
struggle to tackle specific instances of discrimination-based inequality where general sources of 
inequality persist.62 
Moreover, whilst governance necessitates making value judgments about the distribution of 
resources in society (and thus differential treatment),63 with the grounds of discrimination limited to 
those listed in the Human Rights Act,64 judges do not have "free ranging power to enforce the broad 
idea" of equality.65 Rather, interventions must be confined to "particular offensive grounds".66 
  
56  Grant Huscroft "Freedom from Discrimination" in Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 366 at 366.  
57  See Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.81]–
[10.82].  
58  At [4.11]. 
59  See generally Claudia Geiringer and Paul Rishworth "Magna Carta's Legacy? Ideas of Liberty and Due 
Process in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" [2017] NZ L Rev 597.  
60  See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, pt 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, being sch B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), s 15(1).  
61  Elisa Holmes "Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality" (2005) 68 MLR 175 at 182.  
62  See generally Sian Elias "Equality Under Law" (2005) 13 Wai L Rev 1 at 3 and following. See also Anthony 
Lester "Equality and United Kingdom Law: Past, Present and Future" [2001] PL 77 at 83.  
63  Peter Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) vol 2 at [55.6(b)]. 
64  Human Rights Act, s 21. 
65  KJ Keith "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand? Judicial Review Versus Democracy" (1985) 11 NZULR 307 at 
316. 
66  At 316. 
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However, as will become clear, a prohibition against discrimination on a closed list of grounds 
does little to quell the underlying concern of the drafters about transferring policy-making powers to 
judges. Equality remains the empowering ideal behind s 19 of the Bill of Rights. The Court in Atkinson 
described the very purpose of the right as to "give substance to the principle of equality".67 As Grant 
Huscroft notes, in truth, s 19 "provides a vehicle for advancing many … [equality-based] claims".68 
While courts cannot "discover" new grounds of discrimination, they still must determine the 
substantive scope and application of discrimination as it relates to the listed grounds.69 An 
understanding of the concept of discrimination, therefore, must be grounded in an understanding of 
equality. 
B Formal or Substantive Equality? 
In discrimination-based literature, commentators frequently assert what is, in the author's view, a 
false dichotomy between "formal" and "substantive" equality.70 Relatedly, in Atkinson, the Court 
faced a difficult choice in defining the right to be free from discrimination. It could either do so 
neutrally, against the touchstone of mere differentiation; or it could "definitionally limit" the right, so 
that its violation would require differentiation involving prejudice, stereotyping or the perpetuation of 
historical disadvantage.71 In making this choice, although the Court rightly dismissed the diction of 
"formal" and "substantive" equality as unhelpful,72 it did so out of a misunderstanding of the 
distinction. What resulted was a normatively impoverished test for discrimination.  
The concept of "formal equality" is frequently mentioned in parallel with the Aristotelian idea that 
"likes should be treated alike".73 This is conceived as "the process of equal treatment".74 It aligns with 
the basic instinct that fair treatment requires consistency.75 The literary trend is to reject formal 
  
67  Quilter v Attorney-General, above n 3, at 573 per Tipping J, as quoted in Atkinson, above n 3, at [116]. 
68  Huscroft "Freedom from Discrimination", above n 56, at 367.  
69  Keith, above n 65, at 315.  
70  See for example Pojman and Westmoreland, above n 2, at 2. See also Sandra Fredman Discrimination Law 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 11–14.  
71  Atkinson, above n 3, at [75]–[78].  
72  At [142]. 
73  See Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 at [27] per McIntyre J.  
74  Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan "Indirect Discrimination Law: Controversies and Critical Questions" in 
Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018) 1 at 4.  
75  Fredman, above n 70, at 8. 
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equality in favour of substantive equality.76 Formal equality is seen as inadequate to capture indirect 
discrimination – where facially neutral treatment merely perpetuates disadvantage.77  
In Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,78 the Canadian Supreme Court rejected a formal 
account of equality for the purposes of s 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
counterpart to s 19.79 Justice McIntyre held that an approach based on whether people are "similarly 
situated" was "seriously deficient".80 In his view, the language of "without discrimination" in s 15(1) 
qualifies the right, implying a "substantive" approach that only prohibits differentiation involving 
"prejudice or disadvantage".81 Thus, differential treatment does not always violate the equality 
guarantee, whereas identical treatment may often result in serious inequality.82  
The drafters of the Bill of Rights picked up on the formal/substantive distinction in the White 
Paper, substituting the language of "formality" with "neutrality" and "substantiveness" with 
"invidiousness". In their view, "discrimination" could either be understood in "an entirely neutral 
sense, synonymous with 'distinction'";83 or it could be understood in an "invidious sense", implying 
something "unjustified, unreasonable or irrelevant".84 However, they envisioned that either 
understanding would lead to the same results, because a general justification clause (now s 5 of the 
Bill of Rights) authorises reasonable limits on the right to be free from discrimination.85 
The fallacy at the centre of this distinction is that the concept of formal equality is circular. As 
Peter Westen famously argued, equality – without more – is "empty", because the idea of treating 
likes alike necessitates making a moral judgment of likeness.86 Because "categories of morally alike 
  
76  See generally Nicholas Mark Smith Basic Equality and Discrimination: Reconciling Theory and Law 
(Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames (UK), 2011) at ch 8. 
77  See for example Bob Hepple "The Aims of Equality Law" (2008) 61 CLP 1 at 4. See also Nicola Lacey "From 
Individual to Group" in Bob Hepple and Erika M Szyszczak (eds) Discrimination: The Limits of Law (Mansell 
Publishing, London, 1992) 99 at 101. 
78  Andrews, above n 73, at [28]. 
79  At [28].   
80  At [28].  
81  At [43].  
82  At [34].  
83  Palmer, above n 57, at [10.78].  
84  At [10.78]. 
85  At [10.78]. 
86  See Westen, above n 4.  
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objects do not exist in nature; moral alikeness is established only when people define categories".87 
Therefore, statements of equality must collapse into rights-based analysis,88 because saying that 
people are relevantly alike is to "articulate a moral standard of treatment".89 As Pojman and 
Westmoreland point out:90  
Except with abstract ideas, such as numbers, there is no such thing as pure equality, equality per se … 
Two things A and B, if they are equal, are equal with respect to some specific property or properties. Two 
trees are of equal height, two baseball players have equal batting averages, two workers produce widgets 
at the same rate. 
If formal equality is "empty", it can be moulded to fit any philosophy – depending on the norms 
used to gauge likeness. Consequently, the dichotomy between formal and substantive equality is false. 
Formal equality does not exist beyond the abstract until a moral standard of treatment is articulated, 
at which point it becomes substantive. It is up to the person (or court) applying the principle that "likes 
should be treated alike" to determine who is relevantly alike, according to their chosen moral metric. 
As Peter Hogg observes, formal equality is therefore quite capable of capturing claims of indirect 
discrimination – the claimant is arguing that unlike cases (for example, where one group suffers from 
historically-based disadvantage) are being treated alike by the apparently neutral law.91  
C The Moral Underpinning of Ministry of Health v Atkinson 
In this context, it becomes clear that any conception of discrimination must be informed by 
background norms if it is to lead to coherent jurisprudence. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the current 
approach to s 19 in New Zealand essentially embodies a formal approach to discrimination. Because 
the Atkinson test itself is "devoid of any normative content",92 its application acts as a vehicle for 
normative content. While fronting as a common sense and fact-based assessment, a moral 
undercurrent is necessary to inform both of its limbs.  
To repeat, beyond the threshold question of material disadvantage, all that is required for the 
Atkinson test to be made out is differential treatment in comparable circumstances.93 Indeed, the Court 
expressly rejected the "invidious" or "substantive" approach proposed by the Ministry of Health.94 
  
87  At 545.  
88  At 560. 
89  At 545.  
90  Pojman and Westmoreland, above n 2, at 2. 
91  Hogg, above n 63, at [55.6(e)].  
92  Grant Huscroft "Discrimination, Dignity, and the Limits of Equality" (2000) 9 OLR 697 at 710. 
93  Atkinson, above n 3, at [55] and [136]. 
94  At [142]. 
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The test for s 19 is thus broadly analogous to the "similarly situated test" which was rejected in 
Andrews in favour of a substantive approach.95 This section will examine each limb of the Atkinson 
test in turn.  
1 Differential treatment and the role of the comparator 
Equality – and by extension, principles of non-discrimination – are frequently thought of as 
fundamentally comparative.96 As noted, a "comparator" is often used to establish that a claimant has 
suffered different treatment to another person or group in comparable circumstances.97 A person or 
group is treated unequally only if they are treated differentially from a comparator (whether real or 
hypothetical) that is considered relevantly alike to them. 
However, the Court in Atkinson did not explain what might constitute "comparable 
circumstances", aside from noting that it was important to exclude from the formulation "contested 
assumptions"98 or the "philosophy which is said to be discriminatory".99 This was despite its 
acknowledgement of the widespread difficulties associated with the test – which has been described 
in the United Kingdom as "arid and confusing".100  
The assumption underlying comparator-based reasoning is that once the discriminatory ground is 
discounted, treatment must be merit-based.101 Determinations as to the "appropriate" comparator, 
however, reflect the moral judgments necessary to give meaning to the principle of equality. As 
Goldberg observes, comparators act as an "empirical patina", which mask "the inevitable and 
contestable judgments about the qualities that make for an acceptable comparison, as well as the 
underlying normative judgments about the nature of discrimination".102  
This masking effect is compounded by the difficulty of separating the identification and 
justification of discrimination. A finding of non-comparability risks assuming the validity of the 
  
95  Andrews, above n 73, at [43].  
96  Huscroft "Discrimination, Dignity, and the Limits of Equality", above n 92, at 697. But see Hannah Bain 
"Turning Equality into Fact: The Status of Comparator Group Analyses in New Zealand Discrimination Law" 
(LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010) at 9. 
97  Atkinson, above n 3, at [60]. 
98  Ministry of Health v Atkinson (2010) 9 HRNZ 47 (HC) at [92], as quoted in Atkinson, above n 3, at [67]. 
99  Atkinson, above n 3, at [67].  
100  Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11, [2003] 2 All ER 26 at [11] 
per Lord Nicholls. 
101  Fredman, above n 70, at 8. 
102  Suzanne B Goldberg "Discrimination by Comparison" (2010) 120 Yale LJ 728 at 740 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Emanuel, above n 26.  
40 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
rationale used to justify the differential treatment. As Clayton and Tomlinson note, the choice of 
comparator is therefore "notoriously slippery":103 
…there is no limit to the analogies or disanalogies which might be drawn between two groups or 
individuals. Furthermore … the justification of discrimination will often depend on showing that the 
comparators are not, in truth, analogous. 
The difficulty with defining discrimination against the touchstone of differentiation, as the Court 
did in Atkinson, is that it presupposes that justification is only relevant to s 5 of the Bill of Rights.104 
As Huscroft notes, the approach effectively "ignor[es] the need to define the right and mov[es] directly 
to the question of justification".105 Analysis as to differentiation is not morally neutral, and often the 
identification and justification of discrimination will not be neatly separable. Therefore, the concern 
is not – as others have suggested – simply about expanding the scope of judicial review, or about 
trivialising the right.106 Rather, it is about judges inserting their own morality into the analysis such 
that the scope of judicial review expands and contracts relative to the individual judge.  
It is for this reason that limiting judicial intervention to the grounds listed in the Human Rights 
Act does little to mitigate the Bill of Rights drafters' concerns about giving judges "broad and 
unconfined" powers to second-guess public policy.107 A court can pass off its comparator analysis as 
"a matter of logical deduction",108 replacing the need for further scrutiny. Where a court apprehends 
that a case is not properly described as discriminatory, or that there is an alternative, non-
discriminatory explanation for the differential treatment, it is free to conclude that the comparator 
suggested by the claimant is inappropriate.109  
For a simple example of these issues, consider the case of British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee Relations Service) v British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union 
(BCGSEU) (Meiorin).110 The claim challenged an aerobic standard required to become a forest 
firefighter which had the effect of excluding a disproportionate number of women compared to 
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men.111 The rationale for the standard might be that the job entails a high degree of physical exertion. 
A reviewing court, in incorporating "the discriminatory circumstances" (the rationale for the 
differential treatment),112 might find no appropriate comparison to exist between men and women. 
This is because, assuming the validity of the policy, men and women are not relevantly alike, because 
men on average are physically stronger than women. In making this determination, the prima facie 
right (as embodied in the Atkinson test) takes on the work of justification. While this surely amounts 
to incorporating the discriminatory "philosophy" – which the Court in Atkinson warned against113 – 
the blurred line between identification and justification of discrimination means that the solution in 
all cases is not so simple.  
2 Causation 
In cases of direct discrimination, if differential treatment can be seen through the lens of a mirror 
comparator (where the comparator group shares all the claimant group's characteristics bar its 
membership of a protected group), then the inference that the differential treatment was "on the 
grounds of discrimination" is strong.114 But as the Court of Appeal clarified in CPAG, the situation is 
different where the claim concerns the disproportionate effects of a facially neutral policy on a 
protected group (in the case of indirect discrimination).115 In such cases, the Court held, further 
analysis is necessary to establish causation between the differential treatment and the prohibited 
ground.116 As in other jurisdictions, the greater the disproportionate effects, the more likely the 
disparity between groups is non-random.117 But it remains to be established that any disparity is "real 
and not merely a coincidence".118 The Court in CPAG considered this to be part of the first limb of 
the Atkinson test.119  
Questions of causation may throw courts into uncertain moral territory and confront them with 
difficult sociological questions. To borrow an example given by Khaitan and Steel, consider a facially 
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neutral psychometric test which must be passed for job eligibility.120 Black applicants are only 25 per 
cent as likely to pass the test as their white counterparts and the difference between the groups is 
statistically significant. It might be objected that the disparity results from black applicants being 
subject to higher levels of poverty and poorer education – and that the difference in outcomes is 
therefore, in the language of Fogarty J, "happenstance".121  
The objection raised is akin to that of remoteness often encountered in tort law – the assumption 
being that race is not sufficiently connected to poverty or poorer education to warrant a finding of 
causation. But while poverty and poorer education are likely the more proximate causes of failure, 
"[t]hat does not mean that race cannot be located lower down the chain of causes".122 Indeed, the 
"impoverishing impact of salient characteristics such as race and caste is well-documented".123 The 
considerable disproportionate rate at which black candidates failed necessarily pulls toward the 
conclusion that race was a material causal factor.  
Although it may be legitimate to conclude that there was no causal link between the differential 
treatment and a prohibited ground of discrimination, an intuitive assessment as to causation may again 
prompt a court to prematurely exclude viable claims through its choice of comparator. For example, 
if a court concluded that the disparate impact was a matter of chance, it could narrow the comparison 
to one between black applicants who were unable to pass the test and other applicants who were 
likewise unable to pass. Because each group is thus affected in an undifferentiated fashion (and 
indeed, members of each may be subject to similar levels of poverty and poor education), the disparate 
impact observed between black and white applicants as a whole is obscured, removing the need to 
proceed with the discrimination inquiry.  
3 "Material disadvantage" 
The central difficulty with the inquiry into material disadvantage is that no clear methodology has 
emerged. While disadvantage usually refers to "less favourable treatment", beyond this, little is 
clear.124 Responding to a submission that disadvantage defined by its degree "rather than by its nature 
is inherently arbitrary and provides no analytical tool to identify at what point a disadvantage amounts 
to discrimination", the Court in Atkinson responded simply that context would provide the answer.125 
In context, the Court held, "several dollars on one side [of a certain sum of income missed out on each 
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week] … may well make a real difference to the claimant group".126 Where the precise threshold lies 
is for the reviewing court.  
Passing off the question of material disadvantage as contextual and fact-based again permits 
normative judgments to hide behind a façade of empiricism. In determining what disadvantage 
reaches a threshold of materiality, the court must rely on background norms to inform its analysis. 
While intended to provide a "useful, simple and flexible analysis",127 the necessity to invoke morality 
to make the determination adds to concerns that the test permits arbitrary, ad hoc reasoning.  
IV UNEQUAL EQUALITY IN THE NGARONOA LITIGATION  
The above-mentioned normative deficiencies in the Atkinson test for discrimination enable a 
clearer picture of the discrimination issue in the Ngaronoa litigation. The empowering ideal behind s 
19, equality, is empty. The Atkinson test provides little normative guidance to courts. The concern 
that judges are free to insert their own subjective understandings of equality is borne out in the 
Ngaronoa litigation in the two Courts' application of both limbs of the Atkinson test. This section will 
hone in on the instances where the Courts appeared to be passing moral judgment as to the meaning 
of equality (or masking such judgment behind common sense and empiricism). It will contend that, 
unsurprisingly, if a different conception of equality were adopted by the Courts, a different result may 
have followed. 
A Differential Treatment and Comparator Choice 
1 Māori prisoners and non-Māori generally 
In the High Court, a purportedly neutral approach to causation was invoked to reject a comparison 
between Māori prisoners and non-Māori generally. Recall the Attorney-General's submission that, 
because imprisonment is not a "necessary extension" of Māori ethnicity, there was no relevant 
causation.128 While presented as neutral, Fogarty J's implicit acceptance of this reasoning (evident in 
his comments that Māori overrepresentation was "happenstance") allowed an intuitive determination 
as to causation to control his choice of comparator.129 A wider comparison between Māori prisoners 
and non-Māori generally was deemed inappropriate because there was no proximate connection 
between Māori race and imprisonment.  
Such hasty causal analysis is far from neutral. It ignores important sociological research on the 
connection between race and crime. Of course, Māori race is not in itself criminogenic. Claims that 
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characterise the entire Māori race as "criminally inclined" must be seen as blatantly racist.130 Rather, 
Fogarty J's comments appear to align with the view that Māori overrepresentation comes down to 
overexposure to social and economic deprivation. For instance, one influential Department of 
Corrections report noted that Māori overrepresentation was simply "what could be predicted given 
the combination of individuals' life experiences and circumstances, regardless of ethnicity".131 Thus, 
the report found that overrepresentation was not "a 'Māori' problem at all".132  
Granted, overrepresentation – and therefore disproportionate disenfranchisement – on its own is 
insufficient if it is not causally connected to a prohibited ground.133 What would have clarified the 
analysis, as Fraser notes, is an identification of the characteristic connected to the prohibited ground 
which is said to have caused the disproportionate impact – what he terms the "qua attribute".134 This 
enables a clearer picture of the causation between the prohibited ground and the differential treatment 
– in particular, whether the prohibited ground was an operative factor in, or "material" to, the 
treatment.135 An example he suggests is "Māori qua structurally discriminated against".136 Given that 
the legacy of colonisation and pursuant structural discrimination is specific to Māori,137 it is then 
possible to inquire whether the qua attribute was a "material ingredient" in the differential effects.138 
Instead, by failing to engage in the causation analysis required, Fogarty J made an unjustified 
moral determination about the connection between race and crime. To write-off disparate outcomes 
as "happenstance" arguably embodies a kind of "colonial thinking, where the 'problem' or 'deficit' lies 
with Māori … [which] ensures that the outcomes of non-Māori are never closely examined and Pākehā 
privilege [is] never exposed".139 An approach which fails to unpack the relationship between 
offending and the indicators which predispose an individual to such offending arguably "depoliticises" 
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the problem by treating crime as the logical corollary of individual – rather than collective – failure.140 
Granted, the difficulty is making a finding of causation where the chain has grown "long and 
cumbersome".141 But courts should not simply gloss over such important analysis.  
A focus on exposure to general "risk factors" ignores the reasons underlying why Māori are 
overrepresented in those factors. If proper attention was given to causation, a different result may have 
followed. Because indirect discrimination focuses on disproportionate impact, it does not matter that 
some Māori individuals commit crimes for reasons unrelated to their race, or that other prisoners 
suffer high levels of poverty and disadvantage, if, for a sufficient number of Māori prisoners, race 
was a relevant factor in their incarceration. On this account, it follows that Māori and non-Māori 
prisoners were not properly comparable and two Courts erred by failing to consider the comparison 
between Māori prisoners and non-Māori generally.  
Another explanation of Māori overrepresentation stresses the importance of cultural factors.142 
These cultural factors explain why Māori are overrepresented in so-called "risk factors". On their own, 
risk factors ignore the reality that the forces which underpin Māori circumstances are unique to 
Māori.143 The conditions in which the "choice" to commit crime is made must be placed in proper 
historical context. Ani Mikaere argues, for example, the reason Māori exist in a place of relative 
disadvantage compared to their Pākehā counterparts is the enduring legacy of colonisation where the 
colonised is forced to conform to the image of the coloniser.144 Likewise, in the criminal justice 
system, the imported model of individual responsibility metes out culpability according to morally 
defective choice, rather than wider social and economic circumstance.145 Indeed, the colonial criminal 
justice system is in many ways inimical to tikanga Māori, with its individualist and punitive focus.146 
Mason Durie points to a complex web of interaction between historical context and exposure to risk 
factors, where the forces of colonisation – and the resultant loss of land, language and tikanga – have 
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shaped Māori identity.147 He notes therefore, that while "incarceration is the most visible form of 
imprisonment, an equally pernicious type of imprisonment is to be found in lifestyles from which 
there is no escape".148 
Scholars have also pointed to bias within the criminal justice system as an important contributing 
factor to overrepresentation.149 For instance, the Department of Corrections identifies that 
"apprehension rates do not simply reflect actual offending behaviour of persons in the community".150 
There is evidence that a greater proportion of Māori compared to members of other ethnicities receive 
short term imprisonment sentences rather than home detention.151 Of those who were sentenced to 
home detention for "very serious offences", 61.2 per cent were European, and a mere 19 per cent were 
Māori.152 Further, Māori are twice as likely as non-Māori to be denied parole and serve the duration 
of their sentence.153  
Given the disproportionate rate at which Māori are imprisoned compared to other groups, it is 
very likely that race was a major contributing factor, although it can still be proven that the link is 
coincidental.154 The above-mentioned explanations for Māori overrepresentation, however, recognise 
race as a fundamental part of the explanation. As Khaitan and Steel observe, it is unclear why 
connection between disadvantage (such as poverty) and race is necessarily more remote than a 
person's dress or hairstyle and race.155 Arguably, the fact that disadvantage is associated with group 
membership is a requirement that a characteristic (shared by members of the group) needs to satisfy 
to justify its protected status in discrimination law.156 
2 Māori prisoners and non-Māori prisoners 
In the High Court, the consequence of failing to engage in a proper causation analysis was that a 
narrow comparison between Māori and non-Māori prisoners was the only one properly considered. 
An intuitive determination as to causation was thus allowed to dictate the analysis. Unfortunately, this 
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comparator choice (which was also considered by the Court of Appeal) essentially disregards the 
complainant's central complaint of disproportionality, rendering the claim of indirect discrimination 
meaningless. As Fraser observes, Māori prisoners are not disproportionately affected by the loss of 
the vote (leaving aside for now the Māori electoral option), because with the accent placed at the 
individual level, all prisoners "suffer the harm of disenfranchisement in an equal and undifferentiated 
manner".157 This analysis is echoed in the Court of Appeal's statement that "non-M[ā]ori prisoners 
are treated the same way as M[ā]ori prisoners. Neither can vote".158  
This comparator formulation is analogous to that mentioned above in relation to the psychometric 
test. In that example, comparing black applicants who fail the test with white applicants who fail the 
test is meaningless. 100 per cent of all individuals in the two groups are unable to pass – it does not 
matter that more black applicants than white applicants are unable to reach the standard, because the 
comparison is not between black and white applicants in general. But the fact that the harm of failure 
was suffered in the same way by the individuals who did not meet the standard is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the psychometric standard had an adverse impact on black applicants. 
Aside from the issue of its narrow framing, it is interesting to compare Fogarty J's approach to 
this comparison to that of the Court of Appeal. The two Courts adopted opposing views of differential 
treatment, illustrating the tendency for courts to insert subjective norms into the otherwise "empty" 
concept of equality. As noted, Fogarty J accepted that there was differential treatment between Māori 
and non-Māori prisoners because Māori could, through the electoral option, opt to register as voters 
in marginal seats.159 Conversely, the Court of Appeal held that there was no differential treatment 
because the result of the Amendment Act was to situate Māori prisoners in a place of "exact equality" 
with non-Māori prisoners.160 
Both decisions reflect different judgments about the normative content of equality. Assuming the 
Māori electoral option was rightly conceived of as "positive discrimination",161 the Courts missed an 
opportunity to clarify the complex relationship between affirmative action and equality. On Fogarty 
J's approach, affirmative action is a means of giving effect to equality. His approach appears to accord 
with a substantive approach to equality, and the view that "[e]qual consideration for all may demand 
very unequal treatment in favour of the disadvantaged."162 Conversely, Butler and Butler, adopting a 
neutral approach to discrimination, argue that affirmative action policies constitute differential 
  
157  Fraser, above n 53, at 46.  
158  Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [137].  
159  Taylor, above n 5, at [145]. 
160  Ngaronoa, above n 6, at [140] (emphasis added).  
161  At [145] (emphasis added). 
162  Amartya Sen Inequality Re-examined (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1995) at 1. 
48 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
treatment.163 But given that the Court of Appeal did not wish to "exclude the possibility that the 
removal of positive benefits could be discriminatory",164 its position is unclear. It is unfortunate that 
it did not clearly articulate the norms it used to inform its position for the benefit of future cases.  
B Material Disadvantage 
The fear that the ostensibly simple and flexible threshold question of material disadvantage allows 
an insidious moral slip is also borne out in the two judgments. This perhaps could have been 
anticipated from the test itself. While a finding of material disadvantage may hinge on the degree of 
adverse impact, this must in turn hinge on some normative backing. If material disadvantage depends 
"on the context",165 it is difficult to see how morals cannot creep into the determination.  
In the High Court, Fogarty J appeared to adopt an invidious approach to material disadvantage. 
The finding that Māori prisoners losing the right to vote in Māori electorates was not "even indirectly 
a racist distinction or any indirect degrading of Maori prisoners"166 runs directly counter to the judicial 
direction given in Atkinson to relegate all matters of justification to the s 5 inquiry.167 His approach 
seems to resonate with the defendant's submission rejected in Atkinson that discrimination required 
"prejudice or stereotyping".168 It is unfortunate, therefore, that Fogarty J treated his analysis of 
material disadvantage as self-evident and did not elaborate. Certainly, Fogarty J's approach is 
categorically unlike a threshold question of triviality, where "several dollars on one side of the 
equation may well make a real difference to the claimant group".169 
The Court of Appeal did not expressly disclaim Fogarty J's analysis in its assessment of material 
disadvantage with respect to the comparison between the Māori and non-Māori voting 
communities.170 Indeed, because the Court focused exclusively on the degree of the impact of the 
Amendment Act on "M[ā]ori as a group", it is difficult to establish a clear picture of the moral metric 
that the Court was using.171 This may be the result of following the direction to treat material 
disadvantage as an apparently non-moral threshold question of triviality. But it is clear, on further 
analysis, that the finding of no material disadvantage because less than one per cent of both Māori 
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and non-Māori are incarcerated172 permits again an insidious creep of morals. Determining whether 
something is trivial or not requires a moral judgment and the Court of Appeal's reasoning is no 
exception.  
First, focusing exclusively on the proportion of the claimant group suffering the adverse impact 
means the result turns arbitrarily on the comparator groups selected, and glosses over the normative 
inquiry required. As the Court acknowledged in Meiorin, the size of the affected claimant group is 
readily manipulable, meaning "it is difficult to justify using it as the foundation of the entire 
analysis".173 The larger the comparator groups, the more likely the subset of the groups affected by 
the neutral policy falls under the Court of Appeal's arbitrary one per cent threshold. The manipulability 
of the comparator groups is apparent in the Ngaronoa litigation, in terms of the choice the courts faced 
between comparing imprisoned groups or entire voting communities, but the point becomes especially 
clear in the employment context already mentioned.  
Consider again the example of Meiorin, where an aerobic standard excluded a disproportionate 
number of women compared to men from becoming a forest firefighter.174 It is unclear whether the 
comparator groups should be men and women generally, men and women eligible to apply for the 
job, or those men and women who apply for the job. On the Court of Appeal's account, the successful 
claim in Meiorin would have been different if the chosen pool was men and women generally, because 
the persons actually denied the ability to become firefighters make up far less than one per cent of 
either comparator group's population. But as the Supreme Court of Canada in that case observed, the 
argument that a neutral standard is not discriminatory because its adverse effects were felt only by a 
few individuals results from a "narrowly utilitarian perspective".175 This was especially so given the 
ease of manipulating the size of the group affected.176 Indeed, if the judicial trend is towards adopting 
a flexible approach to the choice of comparator groups,177 grounding material disadvantage solely on 
the statistical relationship between the size of the group affected and the claimant's group is 
incoherent. 
Secondly, the analysis also ignores the nature of the disadvantage suffered, glossing over 
important normative analysis. For Mize, one aspect of the "significantly disproportionate negative 
effect" required for a successful indirect discrimination claim is that the negative effect is not 
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trivial.178 This mirrors the rationale underlying the material disadvantage inquiry mentioned in 
Atkinson, being to filter out claims that might trivialise the right.179 Mize gives an example:180 
… if the uniforms at a workplace had buttons on the smaller sizes and zips on the larger sizes, and it took 
a few seconds longer to do up the buttons, this could not satisfy the "effects" standard, even if the group 
of women mostly ended up with the buttons… [because] it would … be trivial. 
Even though indirect discrimination is group-based, that does not remove the need to consider the 
disadvantage suffered at the individual level. Presumably, such a consideration must be part of the 
context-based assessment as to whether disadvantage suffered by a collective reaches the threshold of 
materiality. Indeed, the Court of Appeal's approach is a direct affront to the flexibility which the 
question of material advantage was intended to provide.181 
Regardless of the comparator group chosen, a more logical approach to material disadvantage 
would have examined the extent of disproportionality in outcome between comparator groups in light 
of the normative importance of the disadvantage suffered. If this were the view taken by the Court of 
Appeal in relation to the comparison between the Māori and non-Māori voting communities, a 
different result might also have followed. Largely the same analysis follows from the suggested 
comparison between Māori prisoners and non-Māori generally.  
The Canadian case of Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) involved a challenge to a law 
which disenfranchised those serving two or more years in prison.182 Because the Court took the view 
that the law unjustifiably infringed s 3 of the Canadian Charter (the right to vote), it did not consider 
the second claim that it infringed the equality guarantee expressed in s 15 of the Charter.183 
Relevantly, though, the majority observed that:184  
To the extent that the disproportionate number of Aboriginal people in penitentiaries reflects factors such 
as higher rates of poverty and institutionalized alienation from mainstream society, penitentiary 
imprisonment may not be a fair or appropriate marker of the degree of individual culpability … the fact 
that 1,837 Aboriginal people are disenfranchised by this law, while close to 600,000 are not directly 
affected, does not justify restricting the rights of those 1,837 individuals for reasons not demonstrably 
justified under the Charter … 
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The materiality of disadvantage should not be left to turn on numbers without a consideration of 
what is actually taking place. At the individual level, Māori are losing the right to vote, a right 
"preservative of other basic civil and political rights".185 The loss is occurring disproportionately, and, 
for many, is the result of race or factors proximate to it. Responding to the Court of Appeal's finding 
on material disadvantage, the Waitangi Tribunal's recent Māori Prisoners' Voting Report noted the 
Court did not have the benefit of evidence that Māori were 11.4 per cent more likely to be removed 
from the electoral roll than non-Māori.186 Conversely, before the legislative change, Māori were just 
twice as likely as non-Māori to be removed from the roll.187 Further, because Māori are more likely 
to be imprisoned for lower-end offending, Māori are removed from the electoral roll in higher 
numbers than non-Māori.188 And, as the Crown accepted before the Tribunal, although intended to 
temporarily suspend voting rights, the Amendment Act "actually operates as a de facto permanent 
disqualification, due to low rates of re-enrolment upon release".189 
Further, the cumulative effects of the disenfranchisement provision should be considered. The 
Amendment Act has been in force now for over eight years. As McLeod notes, "individuals are not 
wholly autonomous beings who exist in a vacuum: they are also members of communities whose 
behaviour and attitudes influence those around them".190 Because of this, laws which impact on an 
individual's right to vote may further a narrative of alienation and disaffectedness already pressing on 
marginalised communities. Relatedly, in its recent report, the Waitangi Tribunal concluded that the 
Amendment Act had a "ripple effect" on the whānau and wider community of those disenfranchised, 
meaning the Crown's failure to encourage positive voting habits breached its duty of active 
protection.191 
Significant and sustained disenfranchisement impacts beyond what can be observed in the 
outcome of a particular election. If material disadvantage is properly conceived as a threshold question 
only, it is difficult to see how the Amendment Act does not reach the requisite threshold. By glossing 
over the disproportionality and focusing exclusively on the size of the affected group, the Court 
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presented its analysis as impartial and fact-based. But its analysis was imbued with a subtle value base 
which ignored the unfortunate reality of racially disparate impact.  
V CONCLUSION 
The concept of equality underlies human rights law itself: individuals should have rights because 
each individual matters equally.192 On Ronald Dworkin's famous formulation, for example, 
individuals have a right to equal concern and respect.193 However, as the Bill of Rights drafters rightly 
recognised, equality is elusive.194 It is for this reason that the principle claims such appeal across the 
political spectrum.195  
To return to Westen's argument, equality must be given normative content before it has any 
practical utility.196 The issue with discrimination law in New Zealand, as reflected in the Ngaronoa 
litigation, is that the "equality" said to underpin the prohibition on discrimination has not yet been 
defined. Both limbs of the discrimination test in Atkinson necessitate value judgments about 
differentiation, causation and material disadvantage, which in turn reflect value judgments about the 
nature of equality. However, the Ngaronoa litigation illustrates a tendency for courts to hide such 
judgments behind a façade of empiricism and common sense.  
A more coherent approach to discrimination jurisprudence would, in the author's view, involve a 
self-conscious focus on the values said to underpin the non-discrimination guarantee. With little such 
normative guidance available to reviewing courts, it is unsurprising that decisions continue to be 
reached which "accord with individual judges' sense of fairness".197 
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